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Abstract
Judith Grabiner’s paper “Is Mathematical Truth Time Dependent?” appeared in the April, 1974
issue of the Monthly. Although the paper was published forty-five years ago, the topic is relevant
today, especially as we consider questions about how to integrate ideas about mathematical truth
with a Christian faith. Focusing on the work done in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to make the foundations of analysis more rigorous, Grabiner explores what it means to say that
our ideas about truth in mathematics can change over time. In this paper we summarize and
react to some of her ideas, including her intriguing suggestion about why this project in analysis
was originally undertaken.

In his book Soul Survivor, Philip Yancey profiles thirteen people who, through their lives and
written work, have mentored him on his Christian journey. One such mentor is the English writer
G. K. Chesterton, who, as Yancey points out, was fascinated by both the problem of pain and its
opposite, the problem of pleasure. As Yancey writes, “It struck me, after reading my umpteenth
book on the problem of pain, that I have never even seen a book on ‘the problem of pleasure.’ Nor
have I met a philosopher who goes around shaking his or her head in perplexity over the question
of why we experience pleasure. Yet it looms a huge question; the philosophical equivalent, for
atheists, to the problem of pain for Christians.” [5, pp. 53, 54]. Yancey then recounts how finding
an answer to the problem of pleasure helped bring Chesterton back to faith, realizing that a good
God would want us to experience pleasure
As I read that passage I thought about things that have given me pleasure and mathematics is
definitely on the list. For some of my students and most of my acquaintances, such a claim probably
sounds very strange. They would likely include mathematics on the “pain” list rather than the
“pleasure” list. That isn’t to say that doing mathematics is without any pain whatever. Solving
problems or understanding and proving a theorem can be accompanied by false starts, some head
scratching, discouragement, and maybe even down time to just sit and ponder, any one of which
is not necessarily pleasurable. But when the problem is solved or the theorem is proved, all the
painful work often results in a profound sense of satisfaction and yes, pleasure. In the BBC video
about Andrew Wiles and his efforts to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem, Wiles shows genuine emotion
as he describes the incredible beauty and satisfaction he experienced during his seven-year journey
to find the proof, even as he went through some well-publicized painful times after discovering an
error in the original argument. Although solving the problem made him famous, what seemed most
rewarding was his pleasure in observing the intrinsic beauty of the subject matter he worked with
during his seven-year journey.
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Why does mathematics have this effect? Although finishing any project brings satisfaction, the
pleasure I’m referring to goes deeper than that. What, for example, attracts us to continue studying
mathematics long after we’ve learned all the algorithms we need for our daily lives? I doubt the
answer is just because we can then solve more practical problems. After all, we rarely encounter
practical situations where a knowledge of group theory or hyperbolic geometry is helpful. Perhaps
we do it because understanding mathematics is deeply rewarding and brings a great deal of pleasure.
And that pleasure comes, at least in part, from working with material that is not part of our normal
experience. Doing mathematics gives us an opportunity to glimpse abstract and eternal truths. I
recall having an epiphany one evening in graduate school, when it suddenly occurred to me that
doing mathematics was like shoveling a sidewalk after a snowstorm. Confronted with a blanket of
snow that covers everything, our job is to determine how to find and uncover the sidewalk that lies
underneath the snow.
Over the years I’ve taken comfort that my sense of discovery is shared by others in the community.
For instance, Andrew Wiles describes the process of doing mathematics with the metaphor of
entering a dark room and searching for the light switch. Once that is found and he knows where
all the furniture is, he moves on to the next room. Barry Mazur offers the following as part of his
response to the big question of whether mathematics is invented or discovered. Mazur states: “The
bizarre aspect of the mathematical experience—and this is what gives such fierce energy to The
Question—is that one feels (I feel) that mathematical ideas can be hunted down, and in a way that
is essentially different from, say, the way I am currently hunting the next word to write to finish this
sentence” [3, p. 10]. At the conclusion of that paper Mazur discusses the morass of being caught
up in philosophical arguments. But then returns to the practice of doing mathematics: “Happily I
soon snap out of it and remember again the remarkable sense of independence—autonomy even—of
mathematical concepts, and the transcendental quality, the uniqueness—and the passion—of doing
mathematics. I resolve then that (Plato or Anti-Plato) whatever I come to believe about The
Question, my belief must thoroughly respect and not ignore all this” [3, p. 21].
Seeing these and similar testimonies, I was convinced that my ideas were not out of the mainstream
and saw myself as venturing forth, confident in the fact that my job was to understand and identify
the truth. Of course, doing so requires an assumption that there is something to search for, some
content that we refer to as truth.
Feeling secure about this search, I was shaken a bit some years ago when I encountered Judith
Grabiner’s paper Is Mathematical Truth Time Dependent?. Grabiner, an eminent mathematical
historian, has written numerous papers in the history of mathematics and received both the Ford
and Allendorfer Awards for her skill as an expository writer. Over the years I’ve come back to this
paper on several occasions, always intrigued by the title. If there is such a thing as mathematical
truth forming the basis for our work, how could it be dependent on anything, and how could it
change with time? Even though this paper first appeared in the Monthly in April 1974, I think it
is worth considering today, so I would like to share some of her ideas as well as remarks of my own.
In doing so, I am assuming that even though her paper appeared some time ago, her ideas are still
worth discussing and are not themselves time-dependent.
Grabiner begins by acknowledging that when confronted by the question of whether mathematical
truth is time dependent, our first impulse is to answer no. So far so good! She describes how our
discipline is unlike other sciences, which periodically undergo radical change as accommodations
are made to theories. Although mathematicians generally do not tear down, but add to, structures
that are already in place, there are upheavals in mathematics. Examples include the axiomatization
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of geometry, changing it from an experimental science into an intellectual pursuit, or the discovery
of non-Euclidean geometries or non-commutative algebras, which Grabiner claims helped us realize
that mathematics is mainly a study of abstract systems. She states “These were revolutions in
thought which changed mathematicians’ views about the nature of mathematical truth, and what
could or should be proved” [2, p. 355].
In her paper Grabiner focuses on the revolution of developing a rigorous foundation for the calculus
which occurred in the late eighteenth on through the nineteenth century. Describing this change as
“a rejection of the mathematics of powerful techniques and novel results in favor of the mathematics
of clear definitions and rigorous proofs” [2, p. 355], she begins by offering an eighteenth century
example, showing how Euler derived the Maclaurin Series for the cosine function. Admittedly,
using an example of Euler’s work as typical of the eighteenth century might be a little unfair.
Twenty years ago Bill Dunham was the keynote speaker at the 1999 ACMS conference, just after
his book Euler, the Master of Us All was published. For three days he enchanted us with examples
of Euler’s creative and sometimes unorthodox methods. While we were delighted to see examples
of the genius Euler at work, I doubt that any of us left that conference resolved to enhance our
calculus classes by emulating the great master. Nevertheless, we’ll begin with Grabiner’s review of
this example. Be warned, there are places in this example where you might cringe at the liberties
Euler takes. Who knows, perhaps Euler cringed as well. This example and Euler’s techniques serve
to highlight the distinction between acceptable practices in his day and those of today.
Euler’s quest to establish the series for the cosine function begins with the identity
(cos z + i sin z)n = cos nz + i sin nz.
Expand the left side of the equation using the binomial theorem, then take the real part of that
expansion and equate it to cos(nz). You have
cos nz = (cos z)n −

n(n − 1)
n(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
(cos z)n−2 (sin z)2 +
(cos z)n−4 (sin z)4 − . . . .
2!
4!

Now let z be an infinitely small positive number and let n be infinitely large. Then
cos z = 1,

sin z = z,

n(n − 1) = n2 ,

n(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3) = n4 ,

and so on.

The equation now becomes recognizable as
cos nz = 1 −

n2 z 2 n4 z 4
+
− ....
2!
4!

But since z is infinitely small and n is infinitely large, Euler concludes that nz is a finite quantity,
so he lets nz = v. The result is that
cos v = 1 −

v2 v4
+
− ....
2!
4!

While the result is correct, his techniques are unacceptable to us. If a student gave this argument
we would likely not extend mercy. However, since this is the great Euler, we all smile, shake our
heads in amazement, and move on. This change in attitude exemplifies what Grabiner means when
she claims that mathematical truth is time dependent.
Of course, Euler wasn’t the only one who took these liberties. Eighteenth century mathematicians
wanted new results, to discover the truth, and they weren’t about to stop for minor issues like
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rigor. As Grabiner states: “It is doubtful that Euler and his contemporaries would have been able
to derive their results if they had been burdened by our sense of rigor” [2, p. 356]. Nevertheless,
it is reasonable to conclude that eighteenth century mathematicians also felt some need to justify
their results. After all, even Euler provides supporting arguments in the example above. However,
comparing his method to an appropriate argument today, it’s easy to agree that a revolution has
taken place. But does that represent a change in the truth of the subject itself or is it a change in
the standards for discovering that truth? I believe that these are different things.
Grabiner lists, then rejects, several reasons for the lack of rigor in the eighteenth century. These
include the premise that eighteenth century mathematicians were primarily interested in getting
results, that they placed heavy reliance on the power of symbolism, and that there was a purposeful
disregard of the role of rigor. Her last point, that they simply disregarded the role of rigor was
addressed by Professor Joan Richards in a talk she gave at the 1991 ACMS conference, The Rigorous
and the Natural in Eighteenth Century Mathematics. Richards concludes that there appears to
have been a great deal of discussion about the importance and role of rigor in eighteenth century
mathematics, although the consensus was that “Rigor was a suspect value among the philosophe
of the eighteenth century” [4, p. 15]. Some, such as D’Alembert thought that excessive rigor made
mathematics unintelligible, that it is more important to be simple, or natural, than to be rigorous.
She also describes several ways in which authors developed a geometry by taking a very “natural
approach to the subject, including one by Clairaut where results are based on practical activities
such as measurement and surveying. In short, questions about the role of rigor in mathematics
were discussed, however, a “severe and inflexible conformity to some law,” as rigor was thought to
require, was rejected and other methods were found to support results. Of course, that attitude
changed in the next century.
The nineteenth century saw a number of significant and important changes in mathematics; making
calculus more rigorous was one of them. Starting with Lagrange and extending through the work
of Cauchy, Bolzano, Weierstrass, and others, the challenge of providing a proper and rigorous
foundation for the results of calculus was met. Concepts like continuity, limits, derivatives, and
integrals were formalized, and the resulting theorems had rigorous proofs. What brought about
this change? Clearly, it wasn’t just because nineteenth century mathematicians were superior to
their earlier counterparts. Who, after all, would consider Euler inferior to any of those just listed?
Grabiner then mentions several possible responses, reasons for the change in attitude toward rigor;
the need to ensure errors were not made, a desire to generalize and unify results, or to meet the
protests of critics, like Bishop Berkeley. She rejects these, offering instead an intriguing, plausible,
and practical explanation. During the eighteenth century important mathematicians were typically
supported by royal courts or wealthy benefactors. As the century came to a close, these opportunities dried up and mathematicians needed to get jobs, so many of them turned to teaching. In fact,
since the time of the French Revolution, almost all mathematicians have also been teachers, a role
that presents new challenges. Although mathematicians might be fascinated by Euler’s techniques,
a teacher is likely to feel that an example like Euler’s development of the series for cosine will not
win the day in a classroom. The need to provide students with a suitable explanation for aspects of
the calculus forced mathematicians to concede that the foundations of the subject were inadequate
and that new approaches to convey and support results had to be found. Thus Grabiner argues
that the work on foundations was to a large extent based on the need for good explanations and
points out that the work on the foundations of analysis of Lagrange, Cauchy, Weierstrass, and
Dedekind all originated from lecture notes.
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Finally, Grabiner mentions that more than just a new attitude was needed to affect a change
in rigor. For instance, Lagrange’s alternative definition of the derivative as a coefficient in the
Taylor series is an example of an attempt that failed. This new revolution also required both the
appropriate way to formulate definitions and the techniques of proof that allowed us to pass from
these definitions to theorems. Fortunately, such techniques had recently become available. In an
explanation that we will not pursue here, Grabiner gives examples of how eighteenth century work
on approximations and perfecting the use of inequalities, were some of the tools needed to raise the
standards of rigor in analysis.
Among the conclusions Grabiner draws from her description of these events is that while mathematical truth is perhaps eternal, our knowledge of it is not, and can change over time. Given that
assumption, she suggests three possible reactions. One is to adopt a form of relativism, realizing
that mathematical truth is just what the experts say it is. She considers this to be an invalid
response, pointing out that if Cauchy had adopted this attitude, nothing would have changed. A
second approach, which she also rejects, is to set the highest possible standard, to never give an
argument unless we can completely and adequately explain every detail. Euler must have known
that there were difficulties in dealing with the infinitely large and infinitely small. If he had waited
for all the questions to be settled, there would have been no results for Cauchy or Weierstrass to
work on. Sacrificing results to rigor is not a valid approach. She suggests a third alternative. We
must recognize the “existential situations” that we find ourselves in, living with the realization
that mathematics not only grows incrementally but, as is true of other sciences, also has occasional
revolutions. By accepting the possibility of present error, we can hope that the future will bring a
fundamental improvement in our knowledge.
I find the third response to be quite reasonable, especially as it applies to our own teaching. I
believe that mathematical truth is eternal, however, our understanding of it is open to revision,
perhaps even drastic change, as we acknowledge the need for such change. Assuming we agree with
Grabiner that mathematical truth is eternal, or at least could be eternal, but that our knowledge
of it changes over time, what implications might that have for us and for our work with students?
For one thing, I believe her conclusion supports the position on the discovery/invention question
that is outlined in Mathematics Through the Eyes of Faith. As Christians, we may certainly believe
that mathematics is part of God’s creation. However, even if you aren’t willing to go that far,
you must admit that, as Mazur implies, mathematicians generally believe there is an underlying
content to what we study. Our role is to discover that truth, finding appropriate theories to describe
it. That part of the process is created by us and as such is subject to change over time. This is
consistent with Grabiner’s view. And, as mentioned earlier, I believe that the acceptance of an
underlying content and our ability to interact with it, is consistent with the delight we have in
mathematics.
I also appreciate Grabiner’s willingness to elevate the role of the teacher/communicator of mathematics in her proposition that the revolution in analysis was at least partly the result of the need
to provide legitimate explanations that can be passed on to students. As we teach our courses
we must also decide the proper role played by both rigor and intuition in the development of the
content. We are responsible for ensuring that our students not only have factual content, but also
the necessary skills to communicate that content, that they can be skillful mathematicians. On
the other hand, students also need to be inspired, to learn to use and trust their intuition, to
have a little Euler in their lives. In some ways we should heed those eighteenth century arguments
and allow for the simple and natural to come through, to appeal to intuition when possible. Our
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students need the opportunity to use their imagination, to discover on their own and to be given
explicit opportunities to appreciate the beauty of our subject. They must be directed in a way that
makes mathematics a pleasurable experience for them. If we don’t do that, we have failed.

References
[1] Bradley, James and Howell, Russell, Editors. Mathematics Through the Eyes of Faith, HarperCollins, New York, 2011.
[2] Grabiner, Judith, “Is Mathematical Truth Time Dependent?” The American Mathematical
Monthly Vol. 81 No. 4 (1974) 354-36
[3] Mazur, Barry. “Mathematical Platonism and Its Opposites.” European Mathematical Society
Newsletter 68 (June 2008) 19-21.
[4] Richards, Joan. “Rigor and Progress in Eighteenth-Century Mathematics.” Keynote paper for
the Eighth Biennial Conference of the Association of Christians in the Mathematical Sciences,
Wheaton College, May 29–June 1, 1991. (Published in the Proceedings).
[5] Yancey, Philip. Soul Survivor: How Thirteen Unlikely Mentors Helped My Faith Survive the
Church, New York, Doubleday/Waterbrook Press, 2001.

ACMS 22nd Biennial Conference Proceedings, Indiana Wesleyan University, 2019

Page 142

